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h i g h l i g h t s
• First estimates of level of bipolarization of global income distribution.
• Relative bipolarization declined over 1975–2010 but absolute bipolarization went up.
• The trends in global bipolarization mirror those in global inequality.
• The global income distribution is now lognormal rather than twin-peaked.
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a b s t r a c t
The interest in the level of global inequality has surged in recent years. This paper complements existing
estimates of global inequality by providing the first estimates of the level of bipolarization of the
global income distribution. During 1975–2010, global bipolarization declined substantially according to
‘relative’measures, while it increased according to ‘absolute’measures. The resultsmirror trends in global
inequality over the same period.
© 2018 UNU-WIDER. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
In recent years, issues of inequality and globalization, in broad
terms, have dominated the global development debate. There is
now considerable interest in the economic literature in the level
of global interpersonal inequality; that is the level of inequality
among all people of the world, ignoring national borders.1 No-
table recent contributions include Atkinson and Brandolini (2010),
Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002), Dowrick and Akmal (2005),
Milanovic (2002, 2005, 2012), Niño Zarazúa et al. (2017), Ravallion
(2017) and Sala-i Martin (2006).2 The underlying methodology
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: laurence.roope@dph.ox.ac.uk (L. Roope),
Miguel@wider.unu.edu (M. Niño-Zarazúa), finn@wider.unu.edu (F. Tarp).
1 For an excellent critical review, see Anand and Segal (2008).
2 For historical perspectives, see van Zanden et al. (2014), Firebaugh (2015) and
Milanovic (2016).
involves constructing a distribution of income of all the citizens of
the world, using national accounts and/or survey data. Inequality
is subsequently measured based on this global interpersonal dis-
tribution of income.
It is now well established that, during the last few decades,
income inequality, as captured by standard relative indices such as
the Gini coefficient, has declined (Bourguignon, 2017; Milanovic,
2012; Niño Zarazúa et al., 2017). This result is robust even after
top incomes are taken into consideration (Jorda and Niño Zarazúa,
2016; Lakner and Milanovic, 2016).
Bosmans et al. (2014) and Niño Zarazúa et al. (2017) ex-
tended the analyses of global income trends to include ‘absolute’
measures.3 In contrast to ‘relative’ inequality measures, ‘absolute’
3 ‘Relative’ inequality (or polarization) measures are those which are invariant
under equiproportional increases in all incomes; ‘absolute’ inequality (or polariza-
tion)measures are thosewhich register no changewhen the same absolute amount
of income is added to all incomes.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.013
0165-1765/© 2018 UNU-WIDER. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
nd/4.0/).
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measures attach importance to the absolute differences in in-
come that typically arise when economies grow. While used infre-
quently, there have been growing analyses of the implications of
suchmeasures (e.g. Atkinson and Brandolini, 2010; Bosmans et al.,
2014; Ravallion, 2003; Subramanian and Jayaraj, 2015). Preference
for ‘relative’ measures vis-a-vis ‘absolute’ measures is normative.
For instance, Amiel and Cowell (1992, 1999a, b), have demon-
strated experimentally that people have diverse views regarding
how distributions should be ranked with respect to inequality.
Niño Zarazúa et al. (2017) found that when global inequality is
measured using ‘absolute’ measures, inequality has increased sub-
stantially over the past four decades.
In this study, we extend this body of research by considering
a concept related to, but quite distinct from, inequality — namely
polarization. Specifically, we focus on bipolarization, as developed
by Foster and Wolfson (2010) and Wolfson (1994), and extended
by Wang and Tsui (2000).4 Bipolarization essentially captures
the presence or absence of a middle class. The importance of a
large middle class to a healthy society has been recognized since
ancient times (Aristotle, 350 BC). In light of the recent interest in
the global income distribution, an analysis of global polarization is
timely. We provide a first set of estimates of global (interpersonal)
bipolarization.
2. Measures of bipolarization
Two characteristics intrinsic to measures of bipolarization are
‘non-decreasing spread’ and ‘non-decreasing bipolarity’. Under
non-decreasing spread, a movement of income from the middle to
the tails of the incomedistributionweakly increases bipolarization,
which means that as the distribution becomes more spread out
from the middle position, bipolarization does not diminish. Non-
decreasing bipolarity requires that increased clustering of incomes
– either below or above the median – weakly increases bipolariza-
tion. Equivalently, a reduction of gaps between any two incomes,
both above or both below the median, does not lessen polarization
(Chakravarty and D’Ambrosio, 2010).
The key similarities and contrasts between inequality and bipo-
larization measures are evident from these two criteria. The non-
decreasing spread criterion confirms that, like inequality, bipolar-
ization increases under transfers of income from the middle to
the tails of the distribution. By contrast, increased clustering of
incomes increases polarization, but would decrease any inequal-
ity measure satisfying the Pigou–Dalton transfer principle, which
deems progressive transfers to be equalizing. Thus, polarization
and inequality, though related, are quite distinct concepts.
We employ the following four polarization measures: First,
Foster and Wolfson (2010)’s measure, which takes the form:
PFW =
(
GB − GW ) µ
m
(1)
where µ denotes mean income; m is the median income; GB is
the Gini coefficient of a ‘smoothed’ distribution where all incomes
above (respectively, below) m are assigned the mean of those
incomes; GW is a population weighted average of the Gini coef-
ficients of actual incomes above and below m. Second, the ‘abso-
lute’ version of this relative bipolarization measure is obtained by
multiplying it by the median:
PAFW =
(
GB − GW )µ. (2)
4 A second, more general, approach initiated by Esteban and Ray (1994), and
extended by Duclos et al. (2004), conceptualizes polarization as clustering around
local means of the income distribution, wherever these local means are located.
Third, the relative bipolarization measures of Wang and Tsui
(2000) are given by:
PWT = 1N
N∑
i=1
⏐⏐⏐⏐xi −mm
⏐⏐⏐⏐r (3)
where individual i ∈ {1, . . . ,N} has income xi ∈ R+ and r ∈
(0, 1).5
Fourth, we use an absolute bipolarization measure from a class
of measures by Wang and Tsui (2000), which is given by:
PAWT = 1N
N∑
i=1
|xi −m|r . (4)
3. Data
We use data from UNU-WIDER’s World Income Inequality Data
base (WIID) to construct synthetic global income distributions
for six specific years: 1975, 1985, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010,
following the approach described in Niño Zarazúa et al. (2017).
These distributions are built-up from quantile share data for 55,
86, 122, 119, 135 and 107 countries in the six respective years. This
covers 77% of the world’s population in 1975, 85% in 1985, 93% in
1995, 87% in 2000, 94% in 2005 and 83% in 2010. We converted
consumption quantile shares into income quantile shares by ad-
justing the former with the difference between average shares per
decile for consumption, and for income. Smooth distributionswere
then constructed for each country–year using Shorrocks and Wan
(2009)’s method. This involved (i) fitting lognormal distributions
to the quantile data and generating an equal-weighted synthetic
sample of 1,000 observations; (ii) adjusting the values of these
observations until the synthetic sample’s quantile shares exactly
matched the actual ones. The resulting smooth country–year dis-
tributions were then scaled up by GDP per capita in 2005 US$ at
purchasing power parity, weighted by population size, andmerged
into a single synthetic global income distribution.
4. Results
Density charts of the global (log) income distribution for each
of the six years are provided in Fig. 1. Panel (a) suggests that in
1975 the distribution was a bi-modal normal distribution. This
remained so through 1985, 1995 and 2000 (panels (b)–(d), though
with the bi-modality becoming steadily less pronounced. Panels (e)
and (f) suggest that by 2005 and 2010 the bi-modality had all but
disappeared and the distributions appear roughly normal.
This trend is broadly confirmed by each of our relative bipolar-
ization measures, presented in Table 1. Bipolarization is found to
decrease dramatically over the period, from 2.534 in 1975 to 0.879
in 2010 according to PFW . It also decreased substantially according
to PWT for all parameters considered. The decline was strongest for
higher values of r which, loosely speaking, are more sensitive to
very large deviations of very high incomes from the median. Apart
from a very small increase in 2005 according to some relativemea-
sures, the decline has been continual and substantial throughout
the period analysed.
In stark contrast however, ‘absolute’ bipolarization is found to
have increased substantially, and continually from each period to
the next, according to both PAFW , and to all parametrizations of
PAWT .
5 As r increases, this measure attaches greater weight to deviations from m of
incomes above 2m, and less to deviations of incomes below 2m.
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(a) Log income distribution 1975. (b) Log income distribution 1985.
(c) Log income distribution 1995. (d) Log income distribution 2000.
(e) Log income distribution 2005. (f) Log income distribution 2010.
Fig. 1. Global log income densities 1975–2010.
Source: Authors’ estimations based on theWIID.
5. Conclusions
National income distributions are typically well approximated
as being lognormal (Lopez and Serven, 2006). Our analysis suggests
that – following an unprecedented period of globalization and
increasing interconnectedness between domestic economies – this
is now a good approximation of the global income distribution,
which has evolved away from the ‘twin peaks’ discussed by Quah
(1996). Strikingly, the trend in global bipolarization during the
period 1975–2010 mirrors Niño Zarazúa et al. (2017)’s results on
global inequality: both have steadily decreased in ‘relative’ terms,
but increased in ‘absolute’ terms. These findings are consistent
with a combination of decreasing income gaps between countries,
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Table 1
Bipolarization of global income distribution 1975–2010.
Source: Authors’ estimations based on the WIID.
Measure 1975 1985 1995 2000 2005 2010
PFW 2.534 1.834 1.288 1.064 1.079 0.879
PAFW 1973.841 2296.677 2410.121 2433.682 3033.892 3754.136
PWT
r = 0.2 1.121 1.074 1.035 1.011 1.017 0.985
r = 0.4 1.454 1.311 1.194 1.131 1.135 1.052
r = 0.6 2.158 1.801 1.536 1.405 1.390 1.213
r = 0.8 3.565 2.733 2.185 1.931 1.864 1.508
PAWT
r = 0.2 4.247 4.474 4.672 4.750 4.980 5.242
r = 0.4 20.857 22.726 24.314 24.959 27.196 29.797
r = 0.6 117.219 130.025 141.156 145.623 163.088 182.907
r = 0.8 733.258 821.964 906.175 939.977 1070.524 1209.550
causing inequality andpolarization to decline in relative terms, and
high growth, causing them to increase in absolute terms.
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